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STATE OF UTAH 
~TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint if !-Respondent, 
vs. 
D A >; I E L RA YE \\~DOLE and 
HON ALO ALLEN MAY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
13009 
STATE:\1E:\'T OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant." appeal from a decision denying their mo-
tion t.o di.--miss their conviction on the charge of robbery 
on tht' ground that they were denied the right to a speedy 
trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
:\ppdlant..., wt>re tried and convicted of the crime of 
rohl~:rY. 111l'ir trial and motion to dismiss were conducted 
lwfon• the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, in the Second 
.Judicial Di...,trict Court of \Veber County, State of Utah. 
St•nt<-rn·t· was imposed for not less than five years and 
clt•ft·ndant.'-' art' now in thP Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the decision of tlw lower 
court be affirmed. 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
The first complaint charging the defendant" with 
robbery on May 14, 1971, was filed on .:\1ay 17, l~fil (T. 
33). The defendants were arrested a short time lakr in 
the Davis County Jail while awaiting trial on other 
charges (T. 8, 9). The defendants had the aid of counsel 
during proceedings on the other chargL-s ( T. .1:2 J. De-
fendants were incarcerated in the Davis Count>· .Jail W1-
til January 28, 1972, when they were transferred to thP 
Utah State Prison (T. 3). On Febmary :2:2, 1 ~)7:2, de-
fendant Weddle filed a "'l\inety-day Disposition of 
Charges" with the warden of the L~tah St.ak Prison ( T. 
2). The complaint against the defendant-.; was tlwn dis-
missed on March 8, 1972, on the grounds that the de-
fendants were not arraigned within seventy-two hour~-; 
after ~ing arrested (T. 29, 141). 
A new complaint was issued on ~larch 1.1, 197:2, 
charging defendants with the same crime of robhPry· ( T. 
1). Warrants of arrest were issued that same day ( T. 
4, 5). The defendants were brought before the Honorable 
E. F. Ziegler, Judge, where he appointed counsel for tlwm 
on March 16, 1972 (T. 7). On April 7, 197:2, at a pn'-
liminary hearing before the Honorable Charles H. Srwd-
don, Judge, the defendant"' were bound O\'t•r to :-:tarnl 
trial (T. 10). On April 20, 1972, an infonnation was filt'<l 
( ~·· 1 :.! : . ( < •tm -c·I for defendants filed a Motion to Dis-
r1 ~ ~ ':, '. ~< ·d p:irt ia I h on t hP alleged failure by the State 
~o ::.<1·. id(' a 'il'('(h· trial rT. ~1 ). Regarding this specific 
1-· lll". tlw l'l\\<·r rnurt d(·niP<l dPfPndant's motion because 
'"of th<· h:1(·!·;.!"round on this matter and their being tied 
up on th<· 1rn11~kr trial.;"' IT..:-!). 
'Ilw dt.ft.ndant.; wnin·d their right to a jury trial on 
\~a:-; l.'i. 1! 17~ 'T. :!S). On this same day, they were 
er ,m·ickd of n ,Jil){•ry and were sentenced to a term of 
fiYl' >·1 ·:11°'-.; to Ur· ti' run ronrnrrently with their previous 
:-vii· c 'h·c· 'T. -10 i. 
ARCl1\fE:'.\l"T 
POI:\T I. 
l ':\DER THE B:\L.\:'\C'l>JG TEST RECENT-
LY EST.·\BLISHED BY THE UN I TED 
ST:\ TES Sl 'PHE\tE CQl7RT, APPELLANTS' 
RIGHT TO :\ SPEEDY TRIAL \VAS PRE-
SEH\'ED. 
Tiw l ~nit.eel States Supn•me Court in the recent case 
of Harl.er \". \\'inf,'o. 407 P. S. Sl4, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), 
attt'mptt-d for t}w first time to set out the criteria by 
which tlw -;pt-..·d:-; trial right is to be judged. Because the 
right to a s1H'<'d>· t1ial is generically different from any 
of tlw othl'r rights enshrined in the Constitution for the 
prot< d ion of t }w arcust'<l. the Court PStablished a bal-
ancing tt-st to I~· appli(><l to mch ca~ on an ad hoc basis. 
Four f:l!'tors \\1·n· idt ntifiro which must be considered 
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together, along with such other circumstances as may he 
relevant to determine wheth0r or not a defendant's right 
to a speedy trial has been preserved. 
The first factor ic; the length of delay. "1 B L'l'aus(• 
of the L.11precision of the r:~ht to speed>· trial, the length 
of delay that will provoke such an inquiry i....; lll"('(>Ssarily 
dependent upon the peculiar circwnstances of the caS<·." 
92 S. Ct. at 2192. The Court found a delay of well O\Tr 
five years to not be a denial of the right to a spe«i>· t1;aJ 
when considered with the two counter-balancing factors 
of (1) minimal prejudice and (2) no desin• on thP part 
of the defendant for a speedy trial. 
The second factor is the reason for the delay. Tlw 
Court stated: 
"A deliberate attempt to dl'la>· tlw trial in 
order to hamper the defense should bP Wl'igh<'d 
heavily against the government. A mon· neutral 
reason such as negligence or over-crowded cou rb 
should be weighed less heavily but nev(•rthelt·c;,· 
should be considered since the ultimat<.• responsi-
bility for such circwnstances mtL'-'t rest with thl' 
government rather than with the dc>frnd:wt." Id. 
The third factor to consider is the defendant's asser-
tion of his right to a speedy trial. The Court rPjPckd 
the rigid rule that a defendant who fails to demand a 
speedy trial forever waives his right. 
"The result in practice is likelv to h<· l'ithl'r 
an automatic, pro forma demand ~adP imn1(•di-
at;ely aft.er appointment of counsel or dt ·l:t ,." 
which, but for the demand-waiver rulP would n~>t 
' 
5 
Ix~ t~1h·rat<-d. Such a Jesuit is not coru>istent with 
th(· mkn~L...; of ddendants society or th C t" . .. , , e ons 1-
t ut1on. Id. at ·~EH. 
Tlw strength of a ch·fen<lant's efforts to assert his right 
to a >IX"'(ly trial will be "affected by the length of the 
d('la~. to --01rn· (·xt.t·nt by the reason for the delay, and 
rn11~t p:11 I inilarl~ Ii\' tlw JH'r.--<mal prejudice" that the de-
f1·nda11t (·\1writ·rn·l's. Id. at :2192. "We emphasize that 
failun· !4 1 a...;..-...·rt tht" right will make it difficult for a de-
f1·11da111 to pr0\1· that h~· was <lPnied a speedy trial." Id. 
at :1 1!1:). 
Thi· i11urth fallur is prejudice to the defendant. The 
right to >IX-..'(ly trial was designed to protect three inter-
(~ t- of t lw dl·f1·ndant. The fil""t and most serious interest 
i"' tlw possibility that the defenst· will be impaired. There 
c:m he pn·judil'l· if w1tnt>sses dit'. disappear, or cannot 
acn1rat.t-ly n·call t·\·t·nt....: of the di!'tant past. The second 
inkn~t i . - to pn·\·1·nt oppres~ive pretrial incarceration. 
Timi· ~pent in jail awaiting trial often means l~ of a 
job: it disn1pb family life; it enforces idleness; and it 
hindt·1~ dd1·rnla11t f 111111 gatlwring evidence in his de-
ft•n.:t·. It i> 1'"'))('(.'iall~· unfortunate to impose such conse-
qut·1H·1.,c 1111 tlw~1· J)('l~ons who are ultimately found to be 
in no('( ·nt. Tlw third intt.·rPst i...; to minimize the anxiety 
and conct'm of the accused . 
. \n analysi~ of the fact:; in the present case ao; seen 
undl'r tlw light of tlw Supremt• Court's balancing test 
dt·:11-h- sho\h that :1ppt·llnnt"s right to a speedy trial was 
not \·iolatvd. Tlw lt·11gth of dday from the time the first 
ti 
complaint was filed to the time appellant" were Jffl'S(·nted 
to a magistrate concerning that charge was a littk• ll·ss 
than -~en months. The rea~;on for the dela:-.· was that 
the appellants were involved in another charge of gn·ater 
gravity, i.e., murder. It would be contrary tD the intl'rest 
of the public to allow \Veber Count:-.· to interfrrp in the 
least with a murder trial in Davis County b:-.· tr:-.·ing to 
concurrently prosecute the appellant..., on a robber:-.· 
charge. There dearly is no evidence to establish that 
there was a deliberate attempt to delay the trial or to 
hamper the defense in any manner. 
The record shows that only once was there an ::sser-
tion of the right to a speedy trial made on bt>half of ap-
pellants. Appellant Weddle filed a "Ninety-day Dispo...;i-
tion of Charge" on February 22, 1972, which brought 
appellants before the court on .t\1arch 8, 1972. The pur-
pose of such a demand is to insure that a defendant's 
right to a speedy trial is preserved. Since the first de-
mand that appellants made was complied with, then· cPr-
tainly was no error on the part of the lower court suffi-
cient to establish a denial of appellants' right to a SJWl'dy 
trial. 
Any prejudice to these defendant", the fourth factor 
of the balancing test, is small if existent at all. Appd-
lants were either in jail or in prison from the beginning 
of the present prosecution, ~fay 14, 1971, to tlw prPs-
ent time due to another crime. Thus, evl·n if the 
present action against appellants had not been in-
itiated, appellants still would have been in jail or prison 
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du• iii''. t]w ~aril1· JH·riod of time. Sinre the present action 
h .d 11.J dft·cf up(Jn changing the condition of appellants, 
it i.-.. t xtn·ml'ly unli;_t·I.\· that appellants were prejudiced 
at all hy tlH· n1·arly t{·n month delay between the time 
th1· r;; l compl:t!11t \\'as fill'd and the time appellants were 
pn ( nt. d hdon· a magi.-.trak. There is no evidence that 
th· i · dt !1 :1~t· ha.~ impairul because of witnesses dying, 
di...,app,·;~ring ()r being unahlt· to accurately recall past 
1·\·1·11L' .. \ppl'llanh certainly were not oppressively incar-
c!'r .. i1·d hdorl' thl'ir trial rtsulting in a loss of job or dis-
rupti()n of family lifl'. 
( '1 rt<1inly appt·llant...; cannot contend that they were 
inn()n·nt, thus making prc>trial incarceration even more 
hurdt·1bo11w. Tht· only is...;ut· on appeal is that of the right 
tn a :-;pt·t·d:-; trial. );o question has been raised as to their 
inrnJn·rn·t·. Fin:dly, then, is no evidence to believe that 
apj><·ll:rnt...,' anxidy and rnnc('m was increased because 
of tht ir dt·kntil!n and tlw delay in bringing them to trial 
O!I t ht· pn»l'l1t durgl' of roblx·ry. 
CO:\CLl ':-;ION 
By Wl'ighing t.ogt>tlwr t}w four factor~ of thl' Supreme 
( '1Jurf:-' balancing t4.•st, it i:-; ch·ar that thl' short ddav . ' 
('HU~'(l by thl' o\·t·rriding importan<.'(• of tlw adjudication 
of a murdPr trial, \H·iglwd with tlw lack of prejudicl' to 
appellant.,, impds the condusion that app<'llant...; were 
m no way depriVl'(f of tht'ir right to a SJX't_'(fy trial. 
Res1x·ct full:·• submi tk'(l, 
\"ER:\O'\ B. no~t:\EY 
:\ttornt•y Genl'ral 
D:\ \"ID S. YOl T:\G 
Chief Assistant Attorney GPneral 
DA \'ID R. IR\"l~E 
Assistant Attorney General 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
